02-JAN-2025
We study the three-player war of attrition as a Dynkin game in continuous time, driven by a geometric Brownian motion representing market demand. Each of three symmetric firms controls a stopping time; the last firm to exit captures the entire market. Because the game is not zero-sum, pure strategy Nash equilibria generically fail to exist and equilibrium requires mixed stopping strategies. The model has three regions: an exit region below a common threshold $x^*$, a mixed strategy region in which firms randomise at a state-dependent hazard rate, and a certainty continuation region above the firm-specific break-even level $\bar{x}_n = c/\pi_n$. We show that in the mixed strategy region the value function satisfies $\mathcal{L}V_n – rV_n = 0$ — an ODE collapse that is the mathematical signature of indifference — with the game interaction encoded entirely in the hazard rate and the upper matching condition. The hazard rate $\lambda_n(x)$ is non-negative throughout and vanishes at $\bar{x}_n$, confirming a smooth transition to the certainty region. The recursive structure — each $n$-player problem uses the $(n-1)$-player value as a boundary condition — yields a tractable system solved by backward induction.
